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a judgment, which may be greater than the amount of the insurance
carried. Until the Supreme Court in the case of Rothmarn v. Metro-
politanlns. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 12 Ohio 0. 50, 16 N.E. (2d) 417,
117 A.L.R. 1169 (1938), settled the question and held that wanton
misconduct could result in accidental injuries, the insured defendant was
in danger of losing his insurance because of wanton misconduct, and
therefore be liable for the full amount of the judgment recovered against
him.
From the foregoing considerations it may be concluded that the
insured cannot be too diligent in fulfilling conditions vital to his recovery
on the policy. Too often, as in the principal case, the insured believes
that payment of premiums is all that is required of him.
THOMAS W. APPLEGATE
SALES
THE "FLOOR PLAN RULE" IN OHIO
Plaintiff brought action for conversion of an automobile, claiming
title by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed to it by a retail dealer.
Defendant, another retail dealer, claiming that he had purchased the
car from the retail dealer who had previously executed the mortgage in
question to the plaintiff, contended that the so-called Floor Plan Rule
operated to protect his purchase, which was made subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage in question. The mortgage had been properly
recorded but the defendant had purchased in good faith with no actual
knowledge of the encumbrance. The trial court, upon submission of the
issue, found for the defendant. Upon appeal, the finding was reversed
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals holding
that the rule does not operate to protect a retail dealer against a chattel
mortgagee when the purchase is made from another retail dealer at
wholesale. The Colonial Finance Co. v. Mcrate, 6o Ohio App. 68, 19
N.E. (2d) 527, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 673, 13 Ohio 0. 307 (1938).
At the common law, the generally pronounced rule of chattel prop-
erty was that a seller could convey no greater title than he himself
possessed even to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the defect in
the seller's title.1 The rigors of the application of the rule engendered
a number of exceptions. Thus, in England, it was early held that no
such claim could be countenanced against the buyer at sale in the market
12 Kent's Com. z6z2; Roland v. Gandy, S Ohio, 202 (1831); Sanders v. Keber et al.,
28 Ohio St. 630 (1876).
overt. 2 And in line with the general rule of the law of agency, when
the agent was given actual authority to make sale of property, the pur-
chaser took good title even though there was some deviation from the
scope of the agent's authority.3 But the power of the agent to sell did
not include therewith the power to barter, exchange or mortgage in a
contest between the owner and the good-faith purchaser.4
A corollary to the exception to the general rule based upon this rule
of agency was developed in the form of the doctrine of apparent author-
ity. The language of the courts in many instances so seldom distinguishes
this ground from that of fraud that the two rationes decidendi may fre-
quently appear to be one and the same.' However, some few decisions
have expressly set up apparent authority as a definite statement of the
justification of the rule.6
Searching further, it was discovered that the ground of fraud would
function as another judicial adhesive with which to engraft a new
structural branch of the law upon the already atrophied stump of the
general rule. The English courts early held that retention of the pos-
session of the property by the mortgagor was fraudulent per se,7 and
several American courts followed this precedent.' But on reconsidera-
tion, the English absolute rule of law was converted into a presumptive
rule of evidence.9 Ohio, along with the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States,"0 has accepted the rule that such a transaction is prima
facie void, but that its ultimate validity is merely ".. . a question of fact
for the jury. Unexplained, the retaining of possession after sale would
be held fraudulent, but such possession is not regarded as conclusive
evidence of fraud in itself . . ."" Under the Ohio holdings, it is essen-
tial to determine whether the opposing parties are contesting buyers, in
2 Kent's Com. 3z4.
a Arnold v. First National Bank, 96 Colo. 104, 39 Pac. (zd) 791, 97 A.L.R. 643
(x936). See also so American Jurisprudence S4 3.
'Wright v. Solomon, 16 Cal. 64, 79 Am. Dec. z96 (z861); Davidson v. Parks,
79 N.H. z62, ioS Atl. z88 (z91g)5 21 R.C.L. p. 886, sec. 58i z CJ. p. 65o, Agency,
Sec. z9g, note 68.
.See note 28 infra.
' Cincinnati Finance Co. v. First Discount Corp., et al., 59 Ohio App. 131, 136, 17
N.E. (2d) 383, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 11, 1z Ohio 0. 42 (1938).
'Edwards v. Harben, z D. & E. 587 (1788); Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80 b, 76 Eng.
Reprint Sag, 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. z (x6os).
'See zz R.C.L. p. 555, Fraudulent Conveyances, sec. 77, note 15 27 C-J. p. 578,
Fraudulent Conveyances, sec. 298, note 65 for numerous authorities sustaining this minority
position.
'Martindalc v. Booth, 3 B. & A. 498 (183z).
'rSee x2 R.C.L. p. S56, Fraudulent Conveyances, sec. 77, note 5; 27 C.J. p. 574,
Fraudulent Conveyances, sec. 294, note 29 for lengthy lists of cases following the majority
view.
Hombcck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio 153 (839), at page 555.
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which case, the vendee who first takes possession will prevail,12 or cred-
itors of the seller, in which situation, the rule of presumption is un-
changed, even under the statutes."5 But the delegation of the power of
disposition to the mortgagor is held to be fraudulent in law as to third
parties, whether by express terms of the contract, 4 by implication from
the tenor of the provisions thereof' 5 or by the conduct of the parties
thereto.'6
The legislature, in enacting the Uniform Sales ct, clarified the
issue which the courts had beclouded by stating that a sale or other
disposition of goods previously sold to another by one who is permitted
by the first grantee to keep possession thereof shall have the same effect
as if express authority to do so had been vested in the grantor.' Even
execution creditors were accorded favor by allowing them to disregard
the sale, if it were fraudulent in fact or by rule of law.'" The Factors
.At' further entrenches the legislative reversal of the common law gen-
'= Ohio G.C. sec. 8405; Hallet & Davis Piano Co. v. Starr Piano Co., SS Ohio St.
196, 97 N.E. 377, 9 Ohio L. Rep. 527 (91). See also, for a more careful analysis of
this situation in Ohio, 35 Ohio Jur. Soo, Sales, Sec. 83.
" Burbridge v. Seely, Wright 359 (Ohio 1833); Hooban v. Bidwell, 16 Ohio 5og,
47 Am. Dec. 386 (1848); notes 17, z8 and 19 issfra.
"Collins el al. v. Myers, 16 Ohio S47 (1847). Read, J., at p. 553 "The object of
a mortgage is to obtain a security beyond a simple reliance upon the honesty and ability
of the debtor to pay, and to guard against the risk of all the property of the debtor being
swept away by other creditors by fastening a specific lien upon that covered by the
mortgage.
"But a mortgage with possession and power of disposition in the mortgagor is nothing at
last but a reliance upon the honesty of the mortgagor and in fact is no security as it is
within the power of the mortgagor at any moment to defeat the mortgage lien by an
entire disposition of the whole property covered by the mortgage. Such a mortgage then
is no security, so far as the debtor is concerned and is of no beneft except as a ward to
keep off other creditors . . .'" (Italics were inserted by the court.)
See also, in this connection, Brown v. Webb, 2o Ohio 389 (s851); sc. 3 Ohio St. 246
(1859) and Francisco et al. v. Ryan, 54 Ohio St. 307, 43 N.E. 1045, 56 A.S.R. 711
(x896).
"Freeman v. Rawson) 5 Ohio St. i (iS855).
"Franklin Bond and Investment Co. v. Long, 18 Ohio App. 235, 2 Ohio L. Abs.
205, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 507 (1923).
17 Ohio G.C. sec. 8405 "When a person having sold goods, continues in possession of
the goods, or of negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by
that person or by an agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any
sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value there-
for in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if
the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorized by the owner of the
goods to make it."
"8 Ohio G.C. sec. 84o6 "When a person having sold goods continues in possession of
the goods or of negotiable documents of title to the goods and such retention of possession
is fraudulent in fact or is deemed fraudulent under any rule of law, a creditor or creditors
of the seller may treat the sale as void." See also Ohio G.C. sec. 86z7 allowing creditors
to take advantage of reservation by grantor of trust of power to revoke the conveyance.
'o Ohio G.C. sec. 836o "Every factor or other agent intrusted with the possession of
a bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouse-keeper's receipt for the delivery of any
such merchandise, and every such factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of
title, intrusted with the possession of merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security
for advances to be made or obtained thereon shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof,
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eral rule (note I, supra) where the property is entrusted to an agent
for a course of dealing for the purpose of obtaining a buyer or advances
in reliance upon it as security.
To encourage the conduct of business upon credit, and to protect
the lender where he takes security for his loans, the Chattel Mortgage
Recording zicts were devised.20 To a similar effect, and of like nature,
is the Conditional Sales Ict.2 Under these statutes, the filing of a copy
of the instrument in the office of the County Recorder will constitute
notice so as to foreclose the possibility of legal purchase without notice
of the defect in the tide to chattels, thereby forcing the result that such
subsequent parties take subject to the rights of the mortgagee.22
A novel phase of the problem arose for judicial appraisal with the
advent of the automobile and the attendant financing arrangements.
Where a member of the general buying public unwittingly purchased
an automobile from a dealer, on which automobile there had been pre-
viously executed a chattel mortgage, which in turn had been properly
recorded so as to constitute constructive notice under the statutes, one
of the parties would be necessarily favored as against the very tenable
and forceful objections of the other. Challenged with two persuasive
contentions as to which had the superior right, the courts of various
states and even those within the same state, quite understandingly
reached varying results in their choice between the horns of the dilemma.
Illustrative of the one line of authorities which appeared is a case
decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, where, in reversing a
decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,23 it was held
that the entrusting to the dealer by the mortgagee did not work an
estoppel, even though possession was given for the purpose of obtaining
offers of purchase.2" The court argued in support of its holding that, if
the rule were otherwise, "no automobile owner could safely leave his
car in a garage where the business of selling cars is conducted for the
purpose of storing the same or having it repaired . . .
so far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with any other person for
the sale or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise, for any money
advanced or negotiable instrument, or other obligation in writing, given by such person
upon the faith thereof."
2' Ohio G.C. sec. 8S6o et seg.
21 Ohio G.C. sec. 8S68 et seq. See also Ohio G.C. sec. 8619, providing that a loan of
chattels shall vest title in the borrower when the possession has remained in the borrower
for five years, unless reservation of right thereto is written (as in the Statute of Frauds)
and the document recorded according to mandate of the referred-to section.
5 Day v. Munson, 14 Ohio St. 488 (1863).
2- Utica Trust and Deposit Co. v. Decker, 27 App. Div. X37, 25 N.Y.S. 669 (2926).
-4 Utica Trust and Deposit Co. v. Decker, z44. N.Y. 340, 155 N.E. 665 (1927). The
case cites, explains or otherwise comments upon a wealth of other authority, but signifi-
cantly ignores the decision of the previous Boice case, (infra note z6).
-5 igg N.E. at p. 667. Ohio has answered this argument by refusing to apply the
rule to the case of a bailment for repairs. See Fitzgerald v. National Bond & Investment
Co., (iesfra note 41).
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At an earlier time, when confronted with a similar fact situation,
likewise in reversing a lower court decision, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia had held that a duly recorded chattel mortgage upon
an automobile forming part of the stock of a retail dealer was ineffectual
to defeat the rights of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the
encumbrance.2" "The reason for the rule is that it . . . [would work]
a fraud upon third persons. To uphold such a mortgage would give
to the mortgagor a fictitious credit and allow him to pose before the
world as the owner of the goods when such is not the fact. Purchasers
from him and those who extend him credit" on the faith of the
ostensible ownership of the goods will not be subjected to loss on that
account . . .,
The cases decided by the Ohio courts have etched an interesting
pattern of considerable incongruity. The earliest20 presented the problem
in veiled forms and the court, failing to perceive and pierce the dis-
guises, disposed of them on the basis of statutory interpretation.3" Obiter
' Boice v. Finance and Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. £63, 2o2 S.E. 591, iO A.L.R. 654.
(5920). The case expressly followed earlier cases holding to the same general effect as
to general retail merchandise sales by merchants to the public. Included within the con-
tents of the discursive opinion is a substantial number of illuminating precedents cited and
with some discussion. The step was reaffirmed and followed in Gump Investment Com-
pany v. Jackson, 242 Va. 19o , 128 S.E. £06 (x925).
No attempt has been made in the confines of this note to collate the authorities from other
jurisdictions beyond indicating the fundamentals of the two schools of legal thinking on
the subject. The ramifications of the labyrinth conceived by the Ohio Courts are complex
enough to occupy this Theseus in attempting to tread their mazes, bearing in mind the
limitations of space and the needs of the practitioner.
' Compare the holdings of the Ohio courts (note 36 infra) and as tq the contrary
dicta in some Ohio cases (note 30 infra) as to this position.
2s ioz S.E. at p. 592. Note the curious and unselective admixture of the language
of fraud and of estoppel in this passage. This may be attributed to the generally indis-
criminate use of the words "fraud" and "estoppel" with their resultant obscurity of con-
notation. At a later point in the opinion (page 593) the doctrine of estoppel is advanced
specifically and explained by saying that "The act of knowingly permitting the goods to
be so handled and used by the seller in the ordinary and usual conduct of his business is
just as destructive of the rights of the creditor as if such permission had been expressly
granted in the mortgage . . ." See notes 14, i£ and 16 (supra) and test thereto.
At page 593 appears a further interesting and cogent passage in support of the decision.
*... it would be unreasonable to require a purchaser to determine what could be mort-
gaged and what could not. To require an examination of the records for liens in such
cases would break up the business and indeed be an embargo on legitimate trade. Capital
must seek a more substantial security for its protection. Otherwise it would be better that
the few should suffer than the general public, who have been lured into purchasing from
a dealer who has been intrusted with the indicia of ownership. A purchaser in such case
is not bound to see to the application of the purchase money . . ."
2' Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 22o Ohio St. £68, x66 N.E. 8oS, 63 A.L.R.
674 (1929); Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Warren State Bank, 117 Ohio St. 69, z£8
N.E. 81 (1927); Helwig v. Warren State Bank, 22£ Ohio St. i8z, iSz N.E. 298 (19z6)
and Ohio Farmers Insurance Co. v. Todino, iii Ohio St. 274, 145 N.E. z5 (1924). See
in this connection the note by Lieberman, "Transfer of Title to Automobiles under New
Certificate of Title Act," supra page 25S.
'o The Chattel Mortgage Recording Statutes (note 18, supra) and the Motor Vehicle
Bill of Sale Act. (G.C. sec. 631o-3 et seq. This section was repealed by the Certificate of
Title Act, infra, note 44.) The former requires mortgages of chattel property to be filed
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dicta and the ultimate result reached seem to warrant the conclusion
that it was thought that the second transferee, in spite of his good faith,
could not defeat the rights of a prior mortgagee; the constructive notice
created by compliance with the recording statute was not overcome by
the showing of innocence. It will be seen that, implicitly, the court
reached the result that would be expected under the terms of Ohio
G.C. sec. 8560.
When the problem, reduced to its lowest terms, was presented to
the Court of Appeals in 193o, the rule, without being given its con-
venient appellation, was applied so as to favor the innocent purchaser3"
with the same holding as that of the Virginia Court.32 The opinion does
not cite a single precedent, thus justifying the inference that the con-
clusion was arrived at independently of the two indicated lines of
authority and of the seemingly controlling decision of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. 3 In the well-reasoned opinion, the argument was made that
"To permit the mortgagee to assert its mortgage . . . would be a fraud
. . . and would permit the one who made the fraud possible to take
advantage of its own wrong . . .,,34
By dictum of such strength that no doubt concerning its meaning
can be entertained, the Floor Plan Rule was finally accepted by the
Supreme Court thus impliedly overruling at least as to outright pur-
chases, the doctrine of the Schreyer case (note 29, supra). The conclu-
with the ofice of the County Recorder, the latter requires automobile bills of sale to ba
deposited with the Clerk of Courts. Quaere, why the different place of deposit for the two
types of instruments? See Marshall, C. J., 117 Ohio St. at p. 76.
In the Schreyer case (loc. cit.), Marshall, C. J., notwithstanding a vigorous dissent, bela-
bors himself in impressive fashion to discover the true legislative intention expressed in
the Bill of Sale Act, even to the extent of expressly disowning prior abortive attempts
(see note 29 supra and Lieberman, page 255 supra at page 257), to define the import of
the statute. No consideration other than a few isolated passages is given to the problems
discussed in this note.
In the syllabus (paragraph 4), it is said ". .. if and when said mortgage is filed with
the County Recorder of the County where the mortgagor resides, it has priority over sub-
sequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith." In the opinion (p. 568) it is further
remarked that "A record of that mortgage would be constructive notice to all subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees." See notes 27 (supra) and 35 and 36 (infra). (Italics in
these quotations have been furnished by the writer.)
" Hostetler v. National Acceptance Co., 36 Ohio App. 141, 172 N.E. 851 (1930)5
m.c.o. 1o-15-193o. This case was expressly followed in General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration v. Ferguson ct al., 47 Ohio App. 25X, 191 N.E. 834, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 248, 40
Ohio L. Rep. 2S6 (1933)-
' Note 26 (supra).
n Notes 24, 26 and 29 (supra). Nor is this the only Ohio case which has ignored
the precedent of the two lines of authority. The Pfaff case (note 35 infra) does not take
cognizance of either, nor of the Schreyer case (note 29 supra), which it implicitly over-
rules as to this point, although it does cite and proceed on the basis of some other cases of
questionable applicability. Neither does the Hostetler case (note 31 supra) receive consider-
ation by the Supreme Court in its opinion.
3' Note the similarity in language here to that of the Virginia Court (supra note 28)
and text thereto. This quotation can be found in 36 Ohio App. at p. 14S.
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sion was expressly based upon the doctrine of estoppel.3" But the same
case delimited the scope of the operation of the rule by denying the
contention that it applied with equal force to protect another and sub-
sequent mortgagee."6 So also, and perhaps with better reason, its appli-
cation to an execution sale by a judgment creditor was denied."'
But, in a case arising before the doctrine had been recognized by an
Ohio decision, it was held that a chattel mortgage executed and recorded
before the delivery of a bill of sale for the property was not notice to a
subsequent mortgagee, since it was outside the chain of title.3" The fact
that the negotiations were made with a salesman of the dealer, and that
the automobile was not located upon the floor of the dealer will not
prevent the acquisition of a clear title by the purchaser;" but where the
chain of title is through the medium of a salesman who had knowledge
of the prior mortgage, although otherwise within the rule, such party gets
no greater right than the salesman, whose knowledge of the defect is
fatal to the priorities of derivative claimants."0
' National Guarantee and Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co., 124 Ohio St. 34,
176 N.E. 678 (1931). A similar result was reached in the same year by the Court of
Appeals in National Guarantee and Finance Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 1o Ohio L.
Abs. 658 (193) with no consideration of the superior authority.
s Cf. the language of the Virginia court in the Boice case (supra note 27 and teat
thereto) as to this point. It may be forcefully maintained that the distinction between
sale and mortgage is tenuous, since the elements of estoppel are present no matter what
the type transaction may be. Nor is any indication given by the court that it considered
the interpretation section of the Sales Act, and especially Ohio G.C. sec. 8456-1 (qua
vide), where purchase is said to include the case of a mortgage or pledge as being on the
same plane with the more exact connotation of purchase.
In justification of the court's holding, it is suggested that the distinction may be main-
tained on the basis of the differences in the activities of the parties who are customarily
engaged in the two types of dealings. Since the public in general is not engaged in the
practice of making loans upon chattels, but rather, only those who make it a business, and
who are consequently more informed as to business practices and familiar with the opera-
tion of the recording acts, the element of reliance upon appearances prerequisite to estop-
pel may be missing; however, no such reasoning appears in any of the Ohio cases in this
note.
37 Davis v. First Central Trust Co., x Ohio L. Abs. 3 (s933).
as Ohio Finance Co. v. MeReynolds, et al., 27 Ohio App. 42, 16o N.E. 727, 6 Ohio
L. Abs. 265 (1927). The Todino case (supra note 29) is one of the authorities relied upon,
which holds that a sale of an automobile without the statutory formalities is void. The
McReynolds case may or may not have been outmoded by the change of face as to this
point in the Schreyer decision (supra notes 29 and 30). The reasoning based upon the
chain of title may still be conclusive in the matter, and certainly should be as to chattels
not under some regulatory statute like the Automobile Bill of Sale Act (see Lieberman
supra page 255).
'9 General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Ferguson et al. (supra note 3X) "In
principle, we can see no difference between a case where the mortgagee permits the dealer
to maintain a car upon its floors for sale and one in which the dealer is permitted to place
it in the possession of its employees for demonstrating purposes. In each case, the pur-
chaser is led into the belief that the automobile is in-the possession of the dealer for sale,
and he has nothing to warn him of an encumbrance thereon . . ."
40 Cincinnati Finance Co. v. First Discount Corp., (supra note 6). In this case it
appears that the dealer held possession under the Floor Plan arrangement, having given a
mortgage to the plaintiff. A salesman of the dealer knew of the arrangement, but not-
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When the property is delivered to the vendor for repairs, a sub-
sequent purchaser cannot defeat the right of the bailor, even though the
repairman is the same person by whom it was sold in the first instance,
for the reason that this conduct is not enough to constitute an estoppel. 4
The application of the doctrine disowned in its first appearance
before the Supreme Court in the Schreyer case (note 29, supra), but
later accepted in the implied limitation of the original holding on the
subject is still further limited by the McCrate case42 refusing to allow
an automobile dealer to buy from another at wholesale free of a prior
recorded mortgage. Even the confusing state of the law has led the
courts into what appears to be error.43
withstanding, purchased the automobile in his own name, giving another mortgage for the
purchase price thereof, which mortgage was purchased by the defendant. The knowledge
of the salesman as to the prior encumbrance was held to be fatal to the interest of the
defendant, since "the assignee of the subsequent mortgage . . . [could take] no better
title than the assignor." The court said that "the conduct of the mortgagor . . . [must
have] clothed him with an apparent authority. The liability . . . is based on estoppel
. . . [hence] knowledge of the existence of the mortgage will defeat the purchaser's claim,
because he was not misled by the appearance of authority . . 2'
It might be contended that the result of the case is not in accord with the dictum quoted,
since the defendant involved was not the one who had knowledge of the prior lien, but
was a derivative party who was presumably acting in good faith. The rationale advanced
to support the estoppel type case can be as forcefully argued to extend to the case involved.
See apropos this matter the confusion of the court in the Greenwald case (note 43 infra).
However, since the actual ultimate question was between mortgagees, the doctrine of the
Pfaff case (note 35 supra) should have been decisive of the issue.
It was urged that the Factors Act( not i9 supra) controlled the case, and well it might
have, but the court almost summarily dismissed the contention (page 137 of 59 Ohio
App.) "for the reason that the dealer was not 'intrusted' with the possession of these auto-
mobiles 'for the purpose of sale.' The dealer had title, subject to the mortgages, and it
was by virtue of that title that he was in possession, and it was his title that he was
seeking to sell-not that of the mortgagee." Cf. General Motors Acceptance Corporation
v. Ferguson et al., (supra note 31).
"t Fitzgerald et al. v. National Bond & Investment Co., so Ohio L. Abs. 181 (193I).
The case is still stronger against the bailor because of the fact that no bill of sale had
ever been executed and placed on record. "Mere possession of a chattel is not an indicia
of title" (p. 183). Curiously enough, the result reached is in accord with that of the Pfaff
case (note 35 supra), although the decision is on the authority of the Schreyer case (note
29 supra) which as pointed out heretofore (notes 29 and 30 supra and text thereto) is
considered to be a rejection of the Floor Plan Rule. Compare the argument of the New
York Court in discountenancing the Floor Plan Rule quoted in the text to note zg (supra).
s2 The Colonial Finance Co. v. McCrate, 6o Ohio App. 68, ig N.E. (2d) 5Z7, 27
Ohio L. Abs. 673, 13 Ohio 0. 307 (1938). Here again appears what seems to be a dis-
tinction without a difference, just as some criticism may be made of the differentiation be-
tween the case of a sale and that of a mortgage established by the Pfaff case (notes 35
and 36 supra). But for a suggested justification, see note 36 (supra).
" Cf. Greenwalds Auto Co. v. Hower el al., 24 Ohio L. Abs. 421 (1938), and
National Guarantee and Finance Co. v. Schenke, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 236, 8 Ohio 0. 36
(1937), and the difficulty of the court in the First Discount case, (supra note 4o).
In the nisi prius Schenke case, an individual entrusted his automobile for sale to a dealer
who then fraudulently mortgaged it. At the instance and through the procurement of the
dealer, the automobile was conveyed by bill of sale directly by the owner to another dealer
who was unaware of the previous mortgage. In deciding for the second dealer, the court
followed the Pfaff case (note 35 supra) saying that "if the mortgage of the [mortgagee]
is unavailing against the owner, it is likewise unavailing as against the vendee of such
owner, where the vendee has purchased the property in question without knowledge of the
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In consideration of this state of affairs, it is with little wonder that
we note that the automobile and finance interests secured the passage of
the Certificate of Title Act, which was enacted by the legislature in
I937"4 to be effective as to transfers made subsequent to January I,
1938. The constitutional validity of this statute was recently upheld by
the Supreme Court. 5 Many of the problems herein presented will be
cured; 46 however, the specific exemptions in the act are so broad and
mortgage." The rule of the Factors Act (note i9 supra) was denied as "not applicable."
Quaere whether this case is not reversed by the McCrate case (supra, note 4 z ) as being in
effect a sale at wholesale by one dealer to another.
The Greenwald problem involved a contest between the rights of the assignee of a duly
recorded mortgage executed by a purchaser and the mortgagee of one who subsequently
bought the car from the same dealer who had made the sale in the first place to the first
mortgagor. The dealer, it was said, "as against the . . . [first mortgagee], had no title
to said car, and at the time of the sale, . . . the said [first mortgagee] had done every-
thing which the law required of it . . ." Since no title was had by the dealer, and since
"a seller of property can convey no better title than he himself possesses," the second
grantee of the dealer got no title; likewise, the (second) mortgagee had no property upon
which its security would operate. The court cites only the authority of the Schreycr case
(suprao, note 29), which as has been pointed out (text to note 3S supra) has been partially
bastardized sub rosa. This was not a contest between mortgagees as such under the Pfaff
case (note 35 supra), because the title, if it passed at all, went to a purchaser who in
turn mortgaged the property to secure the purchase price. The fact that the litigant was
a second mortgagee should not control, but the rights of the second purchaser under the
general Floor Plan Rule by sale (note 31 et seq.) should determine the rights of the mort-
gagee of the second purchaser.
It will be seen that the court in its decision, not only relied upon authority of doubtful
efficacy, but also failed properly to distinguish between the situation before it and that in
the Pfaff case, which is not considered in the opinion. Furthermore, the common law rule
quoted has been so generally confined by exceptions and limitations as to have been, to
all intents and purposes, emasculated.
" Ohio G.C. sees. 6zgo-s ft., Vol. 117, Ohio Laws, pages 373 and 7z6. Section
629o-4 dealing with the problem herein presented provides that "No person acquiring a
motor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether such owner be a manufacturer, importer,
dealer or otherwise, hereafter shall acquire any right, title, claim or interest in or to said
motor vehicle until he shall have had issued to him a certificate of title to said motor
vehicle, or delivered to him a manufacturers or importers certificate for the same; nor
shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having pos-
session of such certificate of title . . . for a valuable consideration. No court in any case
at law or in equity shall recognize the right . . . of any person in or to any motor
vehicle hereafter sold, or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by a
certificate of title . . . duly issued in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."
s State ex rel. The City Loan & Savings Co. v. Taggart, Recorder, 134 Ohio St.
374, 17 N.E. (2d) 758, 12 Ohio 0. 57., annotated by Lieberman, supra, page z55. See
this citation for a more exhaustive treatment of the statute involved.
," One problem which may arise under a "gap" left in the statute is found in the
provision in the act that in the case where there was no previous certificate of title repre-
senting the ownership of the automobile, a bill of sale may be converted into a certificate
of ownership when application therefor is presented, supported by a bill of sale and a
sworn statement of ownership. Further, "the Clerk of Courts shall use reasonable dili-
gence in ascertaining whether or not the facts in said application are true by checking the
same . . . with the records of motor vehicles in his office . . ."
Sometime before the changeover to the new system is complete, the case will likely arise
where a certificate is issued upon the basis of bill of sale and sworn statement of owner-
ship under the statute where there is still a prior mortgage recorded in the Recorder's office
under G.C. 856o, but not noted as a lien upon the certificate because of the false affidavit.
Is the clerk bound to check the mortgage records in the Recorder's office or is the mort-
gagee, at his peril, required to see that the liens are noted properly, and do the words "his
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inclusive4" as to leave the quandries of the automobile dealers still upon
a large number of merchandise manufacturers and chattel mortgage
loan companies. Such fields as furniture, electrical equipment, farm
machinery, processing machinery and other types of relatively high unit-
value chattels are still unprotected from the viewpoint of both purchaser
and mortgagee; but clearly, under the Floor Plan Rule an ordinary
citizen is buying under the protection of the law when the sale is out-
right from the dealer at retail and not through some intermediary. This
after all, was the original purpose and rationale of the rule in its incep-
tion, and its spirit should be advanced to protect those within the strict
operation of the rule; by the same token, its application should be
refused as to the cases where the spirit does not follow it, since this
removes the raison detre of the judicial limitations to the Recording
Acts. It is submitted that, notwithstanding that some of the exceptions
to the distinctions within the rule may seem tenuous, on the whole,
overlooking the isolated cases discussed where the courts were led astray
by inadequate presentation and consideration of the problem, the rule
has worked to further the wholesome policy of protecting the buying
public with its desirable concomitant encouragement of business.
THEODORE BOEHM
Member of Bowling Green, Ohio Bar
TORTS
TORTS - CONVERSION
A motor car company agreed to sell a truck to a purchaser, and to
accept the purchaser's old truck as part payment. The seller appraised
the old truck, accepted a down payment on the new, and agreed further
that the old truck should remain in possession of the purchaser until
delivery of the new truck, at which time a re-appraisal (presumably by
the seller) would be made. Before the delivery date arrived (it having
been postponed by reason of a flood which inundated the purchaser's
place of business) the seller, seeing the old truck parked on a side street,
apparently deteriorating from the effects of thieves and bad weather,
[clerk's] office" operate to absolve him of responsibility under the Act. The fact that the
affiant may be imprisoned for perjury will be of small comfort to the mortgagee; obser-
vation in the offices of at least three counties has led to the belief that as a general rule,
the clerks do not, in fact, search the records of the Recorder. The practice is to rely upon
the affidavit and the bill of sale, which latter it will be remembered, are recorded entirely
apatr from the mortgages (see note z8 supra concerning the divergent places of filing the
tvo types of instruments).
tw Included in the exceptions are such major items of interest as construction work,
equipment, farm machinery, tractors and other production machinery.
